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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

NICK KIAHTIPES, DINO
KIAHTIPES, and ANGELO
KIAHTIPES,
PlaintiffsAppel lants,
vs.

Case No. 17528

MARIUS HENRY MILLS and
MAXINE MILLS,
DefendantsRespondents.

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action commenced by Plaintiffs against
Defendants for specific performance of an agreement
relating to real property located in Carbon County.
Plaintiffs (buyers)

sought specific performance from

Defendants (sellers), reasonable attorneys' fees, and
damages resulting from the inability to use the property
for the raising of crops.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Initially the lower court entered summary judgment
in favor of the defendants and against Plaintiffs.

This
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Court in Case No. 15998, 599 P.2d 508

(Utah 1979) reversed

and remanded the matter for trial.
A trial was held before the Honorable Don V. Tibbs,
District Judge of the Sixth Judicial District Court sitting
as a visiting judge, and judgment was entered by Judge
Tibbs in favor of the defendants and against Plaintiffs.
The court found that the agreement entered into by
the parties was only preliminary, that the two conditions
precedent required for it to go into effect had not been
met, that there was a mutual mistake of fact, and that
specific performance was therefore not warranted.

Conse-

quently, the court entered its findings of fact and conclusions of law and judgment (R. 145-150).
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiffs-appellants seek reversal of the trial court's
judgment and an order granting specific performance to
Plaintiffs together with reasonable attorneys' fees.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The large majority of facts in this case are undisputed.
Most of the factual disputes arise as to certain conversations and events which transpired after the agreement was
executed.

This testimony will be examined in detail in the

Argument portion of this Brief.

Record citations will be

omitted for all uncontroverted facts.
Defendants Marius Henry Mills and Maxine Mills
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own property in Carbon County located in the Miller Creek
area.

This property consists of the "Old Mills Farm"

and the Angelo "Peperakis Farm."

The total acreage of

the Old Mills Farm and the Peperakis Farm is approximately
515 acres.
In addition, Defendants own other property in Duchesne
county referred to as the "Nine Mile Area" Argyle Canyon
Property consisting of approximately 2,600 acres.

The

defendants also own and maintain a steak house and lounge
called the El Rancho in Price, Utah, as well as various
livestock, machinery, and water stock in conjunction with
their farming properties.
In the latter part of 1976 Defendants were indebted to
several financial institutions for money borrowed in the
operation of the businesses.

At that time the Federal Land

Bank, the Utah Farm Production Credit Association (hereinafter referred to as "PCA"), Helper State Bank, and Walker
Bank all claimed liens on assorted parcels of real property
and items of personal property.
In September of 1976 a conference was held in Provo,
Utah, among the creditors to arrive at an accurate financial
statement of the Mills' obligations and to agree on a concerted
program to liquidate the existing obligations.

It was

decided that a further meeting should be held with the Mills
and their attorney to discuss such a program.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-3-

On September 10, 1976, a further meeting was held in
Price, Utah, among all of the creditors and with the Mills
and their attorney Therald Jensen.

The Mills agreed to

sell all their cattle by the fall and to sell enough land
and water stock to pay off the PCA obligation.
Accordingly, in November of 1976 Defendants listed
their farming property with Arms Realty Company through
its agent, John r-1arsing.

Two separate listings were made--

the first was the Miller Creek and Peperakis properties
(the subject matter of this lawsuit) and the second was the
Argyle Nine Mile property.

The t·liller Creek property,

however, excluded 60 acres which comprise the Mills' homestead, the same to be retained by Defendants.
Interest was expressed by plaintiff Nick Kiahtipes
approximately three months after the initial listing and
at that time the property was shown to him.

Kiahtipes

stated that he did not think that he could use the whole
property but would contact Mills later if he wished to
purchase any part of it.
Subsequently, Kiahtipes contacted Marsing and said
he was interested in purchasing the Old Miller Creek and
Peperakis property.
Upon learning of Kiahtipes' interest, Mills testified
he told Marsing that the only way an agreement could be
reached would be to get the Federal Land Bank, PCA, Helper

-4-
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State Bank and Walker Bank to decide if they would accept
a sale agreement.

(Tr. 211).

Plaintiff Nick Kiahtipes

testified that he was unaware of any Helper State Bank
obligation secured by the property.

(Tr. 99).

After the Kiahtipes accepted the sales price for the
property it was decided that Therald Jensen should draft
an agreement between the parties.

Jensen had represented

the Mills for numerous years and had also done some legal
work for the Kiahtipes.

An appointment was arranged by

Mr. Marsing, the real estate agent, for a meeting at which
time the agreement was to be drawn.
Prior to this meeting Mr. and Mrs. Mills in the company
of Mr. Marsing went to both the PCA and the Federal Land Bank
to propose that PCA as first lien holder receive the entire
proceeds of the sale amounting to approximately $192,000
in partial satisfaction of the PCA obligation.

Mr. Loile

Bailey of the PCA and Mr. Wayne Probst of the Federal Land
Bank gave their preliminary approval to such agreement but
stated they would both have to see the final form of sale
agreement before actual approval could be made.
While the real estate agent Marsing acknowledged that
he was aware that there were liens by the four financial
institutions, he stated that he did not know which liens
went to the numerous parcels of property owned by Mills and
that it was his understanding that only the Federal Land
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Bank and the PCA directly concerned the property being
purchased by Mr. Kiahtipes.

(Tr. 56).

Mr. Jensen, the

attorney, stated that he prepared the agreement entirely
upon the informations the parties had furnished him.
119).

(Tr.

He stated he had no recollection at the time he

drew the agreement as to which institutions had liens upon
which property.

He asserted that he was only told to worry

about the Federal Land Bank and the PCA in drawing the
agreement.

(Tr. 136-137).

A meeting was held at the office of Mr. Jensen in which
the parties and Mr. Marsing attended.

An agreement was

subsequently prepared and the parties came back to Mr.
Jensen's office on May 10 to execute the documents.
The agreement is attached herein as an appendix.

The

provisions which Plaintiffs believe are pertinent to this
appeal are paragraphs 3, 4, 7, 8, and 14.

They state the

following:
3. The parties are aware of an outstanding
first mortgage on the "Old Mills' Farm" held by
the Federal Land Bank of Berkeley, now known as
the Federal Land Bank of Sacramento, as well as a
first mortgage to the Utah Farm Production Credit
Association of Salt Lake City, Utah on the "Angelo
Peperakis' Farm" and all of the said water rights.
The sellers have orally reported this sale to
both of said corporations and have received an
oral indication that if this contract is executed
between the sellers and buyers, that the said
Federal Land Bank will thereupon release its
mortgage and that the said Utah Farm Production
Credit Association will in writing, agree that
when and if all the proceeds payable by the buyers

-6-
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herein shall be paid to and applied on the
indebtedness of sellers to said Association,
that it will release its mortgage upon the said
real property and water right.
If within
thirty (30) days from the execution of this
agreement the Federal Land Bank should decline
to release its mortgage or if the said Utah Farm
Production Credit Association should decline
to execute an agreement in writing agreeing to
release its mortgage upon the terms and conditions
above set forth, then this sales agreement between
the sellers and buyers shall have no further force
or effect.
4. The said purchase price of One Hundred
Ninety Two Thousand Two Hundred Twenty Five Dollars
($192,225.00) shall be paid as follows:
Fifty
Thousand Dollars ($50,000.00) thereof shall be
paid upon the obtaining of the said documents from
said loaning institutions (which time is herein
designated as the closing date) and the balance
of said purchase price, namely, One Hundred Forty
Two Thousand Two Hundred Twenty Five Dollars
($152,225.00) together with interest on the
decreasing principal thereof at the rate of
seven and one-half percent (7.5%) per annum
reckoned from the said date of closing shall be
paid in twelve (12) equal installments of principal
in the sum of Eleven Thousand Eight Hundred Fifty
Two and Eight Cents ($11,852.08) plus accrued
interest on the tenth (10th) day of May of each year
commencing with the year 1978. Commencing with
the year 1981, buyers shall have the right to pay
additional sums or the entire unpaid purchase
price at their option. Possession shall be given
at date of closing.
7. At the time of closing sellers agree to
make and execute to buyers a good and sufficient
warranty deed to said real property and an assignment of said water stock and to irrevocably
deliver the same in escrow at the Zions First
National Bank at Price, Utah, to be held by said
bank and delivered to buyers at such time as they
shall have bully paid said purchase price.
8.
Sellers, at their option, shall furnish
either title insurance or an abstract of title
on said real property.
If sellers elect to furnish
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an abstract of title, the last certificate of
the same shall not be earlier than the date of
this agreement and they agree to deliver the same
to buyers for examination after which said abstract
of title shall be left with said escrow holder and
shall be finally delivered to buyers when they
shall have fully paid such purchase price.
If
there are any defects in the title to said real
property which render the same not marketable,
sellers agree to remedy such defects at their
cost and expense and within a reasonable time
after being notified thereof by buyers.
14.
If either of the parties employs an
attorney to enforce any of the provisions of
this agreement or to pursue any remedy on account
of the breach thereof, the losing party agrees to
pay all court costs and a reasonable attorneys'
fee.
It was determined at trial that at the time the
agreement was entered into the Federal Land Bank had a
first mortgage on the Old Mills Ranch (one of the two
parcels involved in this litigation) and a first mortgage
on all of the property located in the Argyle Nine Mile Area.
(Exhibit lSA).
PCA had a first morggage on the Peperakis Farm (the
second of the two parcels in this litigation) and a second
mortgage on the Old Mills property.
Helper State Bank had a second mortgage of $22,800 on
the Peperakis property and on the Nine Mile property, and
had a third mortgage on the Old Mills property and a third
mortgage of $19,500 on the Peperakis property (Exhibit 15A).
In summary, therefore, the Old Mills Ranch being
purchased by Kiahtipes had a first mortgage by the Federal
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Land Bank, a second mortgage by PCA, and a third mortgage
by Helper State Bank.

The other property, the Peperakis

Farm, had a first mortgage by PCA and a second and third
mortgage to Helper State Bank (Exhibit 15A).
On May 11, 1977, the Federal Land Bank sent a letter
to Henry Mills stating "We would be willing to release from
our mortgage that portion of the property which is known
as the Old Mills Farm."

It was conditioned upon the existing

loan with the Federal Land Bank being kept current and all
money of approximately $192,000 from the Kiahtipes sale
being applied to the PCA loan.

(Exhibit 2).

No testimony

was offered to suggest that the Federal Land Bank ever
refused to comply with the terms of its offer to release its
lien on the Old Mills Farm.
Immediately after the May 10 agreement was signed Mr.
Marsing, Henry Mills, and Maxine Mills met with Mr. Bailey
of PCA and presented him a copy of the contract.

At that

time Mr. Bailey told the Mills that the agreement looked
in order but that he would have to run it through the legal
department to make sure it was properly prepared.

Subse-

quently the legal department approved the transaction and
the letter acknowledging this approval was sent to Henry
Mills.

The letter dated May 11, 1977, stated the following:

The Utah Farm Production Credit Association
has been informed of the above AGREEMENT by a copy
thereof and the Association hereby agrees with,

-9-
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and approves of the terms of the AGREEMENT with
full proceeds of this sale ($192,225.00) plus
interest accrued) paid directly to the Utah Farm
Production Credit Association as outlined in
paragraphs 3, 4 and 6 of said agreement.
(Plaintiffs' Exhibit 8).
Mr. Mills acknowledged receiving both of these letters
shortly after they were written.

(Tr. 231, 233).

In June and August proposals were made to the Federal
Housing Administration by Defendants to refinance all of the
debts on all of the Mills' property.

However, no plan for

FHA refinancing was discussed by Plaintiffs and Defendants
incident to preparation of the agreement, and the agreement
did not contemplate refinancing by Mills.

A letter rejecting

the first proposal for refinancing was sent to the Mills
on June 22, 1977.

(Exhibit 9).

A letter rejecting the

second proposal for refinancing was sent to the Mills on
August 26, 1977.

(Exhibit 10) .

In the meantime, Mr. Kiahtipes took possession and had
begun farming the property in dispute a few days after
signing of the agreement, and had actually harvested two
crops of hay.
In September of 1977 Kiahtipes was, for the first time,
informed by Mills that the agreement was not effective and
that Kiahtipes must leave the property without harvesting
the remaining crop of hay.

Shortly thereafter this action

was commenced.
The preceding facts are, as previously mentioned, undis~U~
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The central arena of controversy in this case concerned
whether the agreement had been complied with by the parties,
whether Defendants were acting in good faith in subsequent
attempts to put together new financial arrangements, and
what conversations and events transpired after the agreement
was signed.

The testimony and evidence relating to these

particular facets of the trial will now be discussed.
ARGUMENT
POINT
THE FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
ENTERED BY THE TRIAL COURT ARE NOT SUPPORTED
BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE AT TRIAL AND, AS A
MATTER OF LAW, PLAINTIFFS ARE ENTITLED TO
SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE.
Before reviewing the findings of the lower court and
the evidence adduced at trial it is well to review the
scope of this appeal.

In equitable actions such as this

suit for specific performance, this Court may review the
facts and make an independent analysis of them.
v. Thurman, 581 P.2d 149 (Utah 1978).

Creer

And while the trial

judge has considerable discretion in determining whether
equity and good conscience require the relief granted, it
is equally true that where the trial court has based its
ruling upon a misunderstanding or misapplication of the
law and a correct interpretation may have produced a
different result, the party adversely affected thereby is
:ei.

entitled to have the error rectified and a proper adjudi-

-11-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

cation under correct principles of law.

Ferris v. Jennings,

595 P.2d 857 (Utah 1979).
Likewise, the rules of contractual construction are
also pertinent.

A contract should be interpreted so as to

harmonize all of its provisions.

An interpretation of a

written contract is ordinarily a question of law and
therefore this Court need not defer to the trial court's
construction but will make its own independent interpretation of the contract terms.

Jones v. Hinkle, 611 P.2d 733

(Utah 1980).
The meaning and effect to be given to a contract
depends upon the intent of the parties which is to be ascertained by looking at the entire contract and all of its
parts in their relationship to each other.

Thomas J.

Peck & Sons, Inc. v. Lee Rock Products Inc., 515 P.2d 446
(Utah 1973).
Applying these principles of judicial review and
contractal construction to the instant case results in the
conclusion that the lower court erred in finding that the
agreement entered into between the parties was not enforceable.
The defendants contended that the agreement of May 10
was merely preliminary and that it was conditioned upon
obtaining an actual release of mortgage from the Federal Land
Bank and an agreement by the PCA to subsequently release

-12-
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its mortgage.

Under Defendants' theory, after the agree-

ment was entered into it was "discovered" by Mr. Jensen,
the drafter of the agreement, that Helper State Bank had
junior mortgages on the two pieces of property.
Even though both financial institutions had written
letters approving the terms of the agreement, Defendants
contended that the Helper State Bank lien in some fashion
worked to revoke the consent of the two banks and that after
subsequent meetings among the various institutions, Mr.
Jensen, and Defendants, it was determined that the only
way in which the Kiahtipes contract could be completed
would be for a refinancing of the entire Mills estate.
Defendants' theory then continues that efforts were
made to obtain FHA financing but that they were rejected.
Consequently it was necessary to abandon the contract since
FHA would not refinance the entire Mills' indebtedness and
PCA would not then agree to any arrangement that worsened
its position.
Defendants contended that Plaintiffs, through the
realtor Jack Marsing and the attorney drawing the contract,
Therald Jensen, were made aware of these problems throughout
the summer, including the claim that the Helper State Bank
lien was an obstacle preventing closing of the transaction.
The lower court accepted this theory that Defendants
presented as is evidenced by the Findings of Fact and Con-
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clusions of Law entered by the lower court.

(R. 145-149).

The court concluded that the conditions of the

agree~ent

were not met, that the transaction did not become a binding
and final contract of sale, and that there was a mutual
mistake of fact as to the existence of the Helper State Bank
mortgage and the clearing of the transaction with creditors
who had liens upon the land.
formance was justified.

(R.

Consequently no specific per148).

Plaintiffs' theory of the events is considerably
different.

Plaintiffs contend that after the May 10 agree-

ment had been entered into, without question both the PCA
and the Federal Land Bank gave written approval in the
clearest terms to the transaction as required by paragraph
3 of the agreement.

The Federal Land Bank did not decline

to release its mortgage as required by paragraph 3 of the
agreement.

On the contrary, it agreed so to do but no

closing was yet scheduled for the instrument of release
to be delivered.

Likewise, the PCA agreed, in language

substantially identical to the contract requirement, to
release its interests if the proceeds of sale were turned
over to it.
Plaintiffs assert that the reason the transaction
did not close was that they were never notified that PCA
had approved the transaction, and in fact were misinformed
by Mr. Mills throughout the summer that he was awaiting
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PCA's approval and that until it came Mills' hands were
tied.

Plaintiffs further contend that any efforts made

throughout the summer by Mr. Jensen, the drafter of the
instrument, and Mr. Mills, was solely to refinance the
entire debt structure of the Mills estate and was not for
the purpose of completing the Kiahtipes-Mills contract.
In fact, within 24 hours of the May 10, 1977 contract
signing both PCA and Federal Land Bank had issued letters
of approval to the defendants, and all that then remained
to consumate the transaction according to its terms was
to schedule a closing.

Both lenders, however, refused to

consent to new and different arrangements proposed by Mills,
and negotiated by Therald Jensen, throughout the summer.
Plaintiffs contended at trial that the Federal Land
Bank and PCA never revoked their approval of these transactions based upon the terms of the agreement, but only
balked at terms in which extraneous negotiations were being
attempted to refinance all of the Mills property.

In

other words, the attempt to refinance with FHA had nothing
to do with completing the agreement but was something
which Mills desired to do in order to avoid further pressure
from other creditors.
It was the position of Plaintiffs that the Helper State
Bank liens were well known to Mills prior to the time of
the agreement.

There was no evidence that Kiahtipes, Marsing,

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-15-

or Jensen were aware as to which liens went with which
properties; Jensen and Marsing both relied upon Mills in
describing the terms of the agreement.

Additionally,

since the Helper State Bank liens were behind PCA and
the Federal Land Bank, the bank simply had no equity in
those properties.
If there was a Helper State Bank lien upon the property
which was not specifically included in paragraph 3,
Plaintiffs

claim it was the obligation of Defendants to

clear such lien pursuant to paragraph 8 of the agreement;
in any event, Plaintiffs should have had the option to
accept the property with the liens still existing on them.
Put another way, Defendants should not be able to avoid the
contract by reason of a condition the Defendants caused
themselves, but Plaintiffs should have the right to nevertheless accept the contract (and property) subject to the
condition.
Appellants believe that the easiest way to illustrate
the errors of the lower court is to contrast the lower court
findings with the evidence contained in the record.

In

this manner a meaningful comparison can be made to determine
if substantial evidence exists to support the lower court
finding.
Appellants do not dispute Findings 1, 2 or 3 of the
lower court findings.

(R. 145-146).

-16-

For example, there is
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no doubt that over $200,000 was owed to the Utah Farm
Production Credit Association and $20,000 was owed to the
Federal Land Bank of Sacramento at the time of the execution of the agreement.
Finding 4 is partially correct.

Therald Jensen

represented both parties at the time the agreement was
drafted.

Thereafter however, he worked entirely with

defendant Mills inattempting to arrange a new deal, i.e.,
refinancing of the entire Mills estate which included
numerous parcels of land not contained in the KiahtipesMills agreement.

It cannot be said, therefore, that

Jensen continued as Kiahtipes' attorney after the initial
drafting had been completed.
Finding No. 5 states that the Helper State Bank had
mortgages in excess of $40,000 upon the land described in
the agreement.

The findings failed to note, however,

that all of these mortgages were subordinate to both the
Federal Land Bank and PCA.
Finding No. 6 states the following:
Soon after the execution by the parties of
said preliminary agreement, a title report was
obtained which disclosed the Helper State Bank
mortgages and the said attorney representing
both sellers and buyers participated in several
meetings with creditors of the defendants
in efforts to obtain an agreement from Helper
State Bank to waive its rights to receive part
of the purchase money as consideration for the
partial release of its mortgage lien or to
accept other securities for its indebtedness.

-17-
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(R. 147).

The only testimony concerning the alleged effort to
have Helper State Bank release its second and third mortgages was given by Mr. Jensen, the attorney, and Mr. Stan
Litizetti, an attorney for Helper State Bank.

Mr. Jensen

stated the following:
Q.

(By Mr. Martineau)
Now, was Helper State
Bank asked to release a lien on the Kiahtipes
property and that is the property that was
being sold to Kiahtipes?

A.

I don't recall that.

Q.

Do you recall them being asked to release a
lien on the mountain land, that is, the range
land, in connection with this refinancing
arrangement that was being proposed and
discussed.

A.

Well, at these meetings, I don't think they
were asked that.
They might have been; I
don't remember that, but I don't think that
was the object of the meetings was to come
out and ask and come out and point the finger
at them and say, "Now you release this one."
There was a discussion as to what might be
done, see.

Q.

Okay.
It was a discussion of how Mr. Mills
might be best preserved; is that right?

A.

Well, I don't know whether it was Mr. Mills'
position but there was a discussion as to how
these lending institutions could get their
money.

(Tr. 145-146).
Mr. Litizetti, the attorney for Helper State Bank,
testified that two meetings were held with Mr. Jensen and
various other creditors in the sUTILmer of 1977.

When asked
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about the purpose of these meetings, however, his testimony
revealed that the purpose was not to complete the KiahtipesMills contract but was rather to find a way to refinance
all of Mills' estate.
Q.

(By Mr. Martineau)
Stan, you didn't understand
there was a potential sale between Kiahtipes
and Mr. Mills at these meetings?

A.

At the time of the meeting in Therald's office?

Q.

Yes.

A.

~.

Q.

You mentioned two meetings in Therald's office.
At the second one you didn't understand that at
all?

A.

I did not understand that at all.

Q.

Let me ask you this: Was Helper State Bank,
to your knowledge, ever asked to release that
mortgage with respect to the property that was
being sold to Mr. Kiahtipes?

A.

Not to my knowledge.

Q.

Did they ever ask Helper State Bank to release
a lot of other properties in connection with
this refinancing?

A.

Prior to that meeting?

Q.

Yes.

A.

Not to my knowledge.

Q.

Did they at that meeting?

A.

My notes do not disclose anything other than
the whole agreement being to refinance with
Farmers Home Administration.

Q.

Take everyone out?

A.

That's what my notes say, yes.
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Q.

But not with regard to the Kiahtipes-Mills
transaction?

A.

No.
I don't remember any relative releases
as against Production Credit, Federal Land
Bank, with the Helper State Bank.

(Tr. 160-161) .
This testimony clearly shows that no effort was made
by Defendants or their attorney to release the Helper State
Bank's second and third mortgages but that sole efforts
were made to obtain a refinancing of all of the debts to
all of the banks through the FHA.

Such an effort was

hardly in the best interest of Plaintiffs as to the
completion of their contract dealing with only a small
part of the total Mills Estate, and to bind Kiahtipes to
the acts of Therald Jensen in attempting a refinancing
would work an injustice.
Finding No. 6 contained further erroneous statements:
Such attorney also met with representatives
of the Federal Land Bank and Production Credit
Association to obtain partial releases of land to
be substituted as security for the Helper State
Bank indebtedness.
Said attorney also made an
effort to refinance all of the sellers' indebtedness to make effective and to close the said
preliminary agreement. All of the efforts hereinabove referred to were in good faith for the
purpose of meeting the conditions of the abovequoted paragraph 3 of the agreement.
This finding is supported by neither logic nor the
evidence.

It is clear from the court's own finding No. 2

that Defendants owed Utah Farm Production Credit Association
in excess of $200,000 which was secured by mortgages on the
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land involved in the Kiahtipes sale.

Since the proceeds

of the sale were to be less than $200,000 the Helper State
Bank lien as a second and third mortgage on the two parcels
of property would have had no effect upon PCA receiving the
proceeds.

It clearly was not necessary to refinance all

of the sellers' indebtedness in order to close the Kiahtipes
deal.
While admittedly Mr. Jensen characterized his efforts
for refinancing as essential to consummate the KiahtipesMills contract, it was only so because Mr. Jensen had
ignored that contract and was attempting to fulfill it as
a part of the larger refinancing package.

The testimony

of all of the other officers of the bank relating to the
purposes of the summer meetings pointed to refinancing, not
completion of the original agreement.
Mr. Litizetti, the attorney for Helper State Bank,
testified that the Kiahtipes loan was not mentioned during
the meetings and that he was not even aware that Kiahtipes
was intending on purchasing any of the property.
161) .

(Tr. 160-

He stated that none of the bankers were willing to

release anything without a totally agreed upon liquidation
of all debts.

He stated that the bankers would not give up

their various positions as to all of the properties owned
by Mills and therefore the only answer was to seek refinancing

from the FHA.

The Kiahtipes deal was never considered in
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that meeting.

(Tr. 159-160).

Gerald Naylor, the office manager of PCA, stated that
Jensen wished PCA to give up its first mortgage on 60
acres of the Mills homestead plus all the range.

He stated

that Jensen wanted to do this so that Helper State Bank
could have a mortgage on it.

He replied that PCA was not

in favor of any type of arrangement that would put it in
a worse position than it was already in.

(Tr. 183).

Naylor specifically stated in his testimony that at
no time prior to September of 1977 was he asked to approve
the Kiahtipes transaction.

Instead, PCA was asked to give

up property such as the homestead interest which was not
even included in the Mills-Kiahtipes agreement.

Naylor

stated unequivocably that if all of the proceeds of the
contract went directly to PCA that he would still approve
the sale on behalf of PCA.

(Tr. 196-197).

Finally, Mr. Loile Bailey who was the predecessor of
Mr. Naylor stated that at the time he left the employment
with PCA it was his understanding that PCA had approved the
sale and it was just waiting for the paperwork to be completed.

(Tr. 273).

He further stated tnat at the time he

allowed additional credit to Mills on the property he was
aware of the Helper State Bank loan and at the time he
approved the PCA package in his letter of May 11 he was
also aware of the Helper State Bank interest.

He stated
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that this did not affect his decision in approving the transaction.

(Tr. 280).

The evidence requires a finding that

Defendants and their attorney, Therald Jensen, did not act
in good faith in attempting to complete the Kiahtipes-Mills
contract according to its terms but rather attempted a
new way to solve the overall Mills problems.

It was clearly

in Mills' sole interest to attempt this refinancing of
the entire estate and had nothing whatsoever to do with the
property being sold to Kiahtipes.
Finding No. 7 is also an incorrect statement of the
legal requirement mandated by paragraph 3 of the agreement.
Finding No. 7 states the following:
No release of the Federal Land Bank mortgage
was obtained as required by said paragraph 3 or at
all and no unconditional agreement for release
was obtained from the Production Credit Association; that the letters, exhibits numbered 2 and 3
did not meet the requirements of the above quoted
paragraph 3; that all efforts to close the transaction for the sale of the land and the water
stock by obtaining the documents from the loaning
institutions as provided by the above-quoted
paragraph 3 failed and no payments were made by
the buyers to the sellers on the purchase price.
No escrow arrangement was made at Zions First
National Bank in Price or with any other bank
or escrow holder and no deed and no endorsed
certificates of stock were deposited with any
escrow holder.
(R. 147-148).

This finding is clearly erroneous.

It has been

Plaintiffs' position throughout this lawsuit that the
agreement is not ambiguous and does not require judicial
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construction.

Instead, it only remains to examine the

language of paragraph 3 and the subsequent action taken
by the lending institutions.

Paragraph 3 of the agree-

ment basically boils down to the following pertinent
language:
If within 30 days from the execution of
this Agreement the Federal Land Bank should
decline to release its mortgage or if the said
Utah Farm Production Credit Association should
decline to execute an agreement in writing
agreeing to release its mortgage upon the
terms and conditions above set forth, then
this sales agreement between the sellers and
buyers shall have no further force or effect.
(Emphasis added).
(Exhibit 1)
The Federal Land Bank did not decline to release its
mortgage.

The letter written to Mr. Mills dated .May 11,

1977, by Wayne Probst, Manager of the Federal Land Bank,
stated the following:
This letter is written in confirmation
of our mutual agreement made yesterday, May 10,
in our office, that we would be willing to
release from our mortgage that portion of the
property which is known as the "Old Mills Farm."
This Agreement to make the release at some
future time, will have to comply with the then
existing partial release policy of the bank.
The release is contingent upon our loan being
kept current and that all the monies, approximately $192,000 from the sale of this and the
Peperakis farm are applied to your now existing
debt to the Utah Farm Production Credit Association.
(Emphasis added).
(Exhibit 2).
Naturally, the mortgage itself was never actually
released since the escrow account had not been set up and
since no money had been paid over to PCA as required by

-24-
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the Federal Land Bank.

Defendants maintained that the

actual release of mortgage was required in order to meet the
requirements of paragraph 3.

However, a reading of the entire

agreement shows that the bank would not release its mortgage
until the establishment of the escrow account pursuant to
paragraphs 6 and 7 and that the mortgage release would be
placed into that account along with the various other documents from PCA.

It is an unreasonable interpretation of the

contract to have expected the Federal Land Bank to give up
its security interest in the property without being assured
that PCA was going to receive the proceeds of an arms-length
sale.

There is no evidence in the record to show that the

Federal Land Bank ever repudiated this agreement to release
its mortgage at the appropriate time.
Likewise, PCA executed an agreement in writing agreeing
to release its mortgage.

In a letter dated May 11, 1977 to

Mr. Mills from Loile Bailey the following statements were
made:
Reference is made to that certain agreement
entered into on the 10th day of May, 1977, by and
between M. Henry Mills and Maxine Mills, his wife,
sellers and Nick Kiahtipes, Dino Kiahtipes, and
Angelo Kiahtipes, buyers.
The Utah Farm Production Credit Association
has been informed of the above agreement by a
copy thereof and the Association hereby agrees
with, and approves of the terms of the agreement,
with full proceeds of this sale ($192,225 plus
interest accrued) paid directly to the Utah Farm
Production Credit Association as outlined in para-

-25-
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graphs 3, 4 and 6 of said agreement.

(Exhibit

8).

As before, the defendants did not show that this
agreement relating to the specific transaction referred to
in the agreement had been rescinded or repudiated by PCA
and, in fact, the testimony of Mr. Naylor, the successor
of Mr. Bailey, indicated that such transaction as outlined
in the original agreement would be honored.

(Tr. 196-197).

The fact that PCA would not agree to give up its
mortgage on the land not involved in this sale, or substitute
Helper State Bank in its place as to land involved in the
sale so that Defendants could refinance the entire structure
of their indebtedness, does not in any way affect the conditions as outlined in paragraph 3 of the agreement.

Plaintiffs

did not agree that refinancing was a condition to their
purchase and therefore cannot be held accountable for
Defendants' unsuccessful efforts to obtain this goal.
The record shows unequivocably that the terms as outlined in paragraph 3 of the agreement were immediately and
precisely met by the banking institutions.

The only reason

that a closing did not occur was the failure by Defendants
to notify Plaintiffs that PCA had given its written approval
and because of Defendants' subsequent assertion that no PCA
approval could be obtained.
Even Mr. Marsing, Defendants' own real estate agent,
w~s

never told of the PCA approval letter of May 11.
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He

stated he had never seen the letter from Mr. Bailey,
Exhibit 3, until after the lawsuit was filed.

(Tr. 36).

He stated that when he talked to Mills on several occasions
and asked him what was holding up the deal Mills indicated
that PCA had not given its approval and that he could not
force their hand.

He said, "My hands are tied.

force the issue."

(Tr. 42).

I can't

Nick Kiahtipes, the plaintiff in this case, stated
that he never received a letter written by Mr. Bailey to
him concerning the approval of the PCA.

(Exhibit 3).

He

stated that he never saw this letter until after the lawsuit
was filed and a copy was obtained by his counsel.

(Tr. 79).

In fact, the original document was obtained from Defendants'
own legal files.
Kiahtipes was told in September by Mills to leave the
premises and not to cut the third crop of hay since PCA
would not accept the contract.

Kiahtipes stated that Mills

also said he had changed his mind about selling and the
deal was off.

(Tr. 81).

Mills stated that to his knowledge a release by PCA
was never obtained.

(Tr. 219).

He admitted telling Kiahtipes

to get off his land because PCA would not give a release.
(Tr. 222).

He also admitted receiving the letter from Mr.

Bailey of May 11 notifying him of PCA's approval.

(Tr.

231).

-27-
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Essentially, as a matter of law, both the Federal Land
Bank and the PCA were willing to release their liens upon
the property after the appropriate escrows and payments
had been made.

The 30-day requirement of paragraph 3

related only to notification by the two organizations as
to whether they were willing to release their liens.
There is nothing contained in the agreement stating when
the closing was to occur.

Thus, the 30-day time limit

related only to extinguishing the two conditions precedent,
namely, the approval by PCA and the Federal Land Bank to
release their interests.

After they had so agreed the

closing could have occurred any time as provided for in
paragraph 8.
A review of the evidence shows that the Helper State
Bank lien existing upon the property subject to sale had
no effect whatsoever upon this transaction.

Since the sale

to Kiahtipes was clearly an arms-length transaction and
no contention is made that the purchase price was not a fair
value for the property, it is clear that the Helper

State

Bank second and third mortgages on the Peperakis property
and its third mortgage on the Old Mill property would never
have come into effect and Helper State Bank would have
received nothing as a junior mortgagor.

The use of the

Helper State Bank lien as an excuse was solely for the
purpose of avoiding the sale and in attempting to arrange
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a refinancing of all of the debts owed by Mills to the
various institutions.
In addition, if the Helper State Bank liens were in
fact a problem it was for Kiahtipes, not Mills, to elect
what remedy should be pursued.

In other words, since the

Helper State Bank lien was not listed as a condition precedent in the agreement it merely amounted to a title defect
and under the provisions of paragraph 8 the sellers were
obligated to remedy such defects at their own cost and expense
within a reasonable time after being notified.
If Kiahtipes wished to take the property with the
Helper State Bank lien still in effect it was his privilege
to do so.

The purpose of clearing title is obviously for

the buyer and not for the seller.

This court in Eliason v.

Watts, 615 P.2d 427 (Utah 1980), recognized this principle
as follows:
The failure to obtain a permit does
not deprive defendant of any valuable right.
The provision was added to the contract by
plaintiffs, and the condition was clearly for
their benefit in putting the property to its
desired use.
It was the plaintiffs who were
entitled to demand the benefit of that condition, and if they choose to waive the
condition it was within their power to do so.
Id. at 430.
Also, as stated by this Court in Huck v. Hayes, 560
P.2d 1124 (Utah 1977), "It is fundamental that a party to
a contract should obtain no advantage from the fact that
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he is himself unable to perform."

The Huck case also

notes that a buyer is not obligated to pay or tender
money or property until such time as the seller produces
good title and that the furnishing of such title "was a
condition precedent to his right to demand payment from
the purchaser."

Id. at 1126.

The Huck case is also similar as to the motivations
which Mills in this case had in failing to close the
transaction.

In Huck this Court stated:

The evidence justified the view taken by
the trial court that the negotiations between
the parties indicated an onqoing intent to carry
out the contract as soon as the hereinabove
mentioned title difficulties had been remedied;
and that the defendant, for reasons of his own,
had apparently changed his mind and attempted to
assert deficiencies for which he was himself
responsible to avoid going through with the
deal.
Id.
at 1126.
Since there is no evidence to justify how the Helper
State liens could have possibly precluded PCA or the Federal
Land Bank from agreeing to the releases of its mortgage it
must be assumed that the claim of the lien was a "red
herring" for the purpose of allowing Mills the opportunity
to seek another solution to his problems.

Furthermore,

that excuse appears to have first been used after the PCA
excuse failed for lack of factual basis.

Mr. Marsing, the

real estate agent retained by Mills, stated that in a
conversation he had with Mrs. Mills in September of 1977
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she stated that the deal wasn't going to go through since
the Mills had found another avenue of money.

She said

they could now sell the water stock for more than the total
sales price of the listing and yet still be able to retain
their land.

(Tr. 39).

This testimony was corroborated

by Mr. Naylor, the officer at PCA, who stated that in
September Mills told him he wanted to sell his water stock
and keep the ranch and not sell it to Kiahtipes.

(Tr. 188).

Thus, not only did Defendants fail to inform Plaintiffs
of the PCA approval which is required before any condition
precedent can be relied upon, Williamson v. Wanlass, 545
P.2d 1145 (Utah 1976), but also the Mills failed to act in
good faith with regard to the agreement and failed to cooperate
so that the agreement could be performed.

Tanner v. Baadsgaard,

612 P.2d 345 (Utah 1980); Ferris v. Jennings, 595 P.2d 857
(Utah 1979).
The conclusions of law entered by the trial court were
erroneous since they were based upon erroneous factual
assumptions as contained in the Findings of Fact.

However,

Conclusion of Law No. 2 also stated:
There was a mutual mistake of fact as to
the existence of the Helper State Bank mortgage and the clearing of the transaction
with creditors who had liens upon the land
and water stock described in the preliminary
agreement.
(R. 148).
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It is fundamental that evidence to sustain mutual
mistake of fact must be clear, definite and convincing.
Eliason v. Johnson, 523 P.2d 647 (Utah 1967).

The only

possible mistake of fact which could be referred to in
this Conclusion is the failure of the parties to include
the Helper State Bank in the agreement.

However, the

evidence is clear that only Mills at the time of the
agreement was aware of the obligations each financial
institution had upon the various parcels of land.

Neither

Jensen, Marsing, nor Kiahtipes were aware of the breakdown,
nor particularly cared if it didn't affect the sale.

If

any mistake was made, therefore, in omitting the Helper
State Bank lien from the conditions it was made entirely
by Mr. Mills.

Such "mistake" was not raised until after

Mills decided not to sell, was not attempted to be rectified
in good faith, and amounted to an immaterial matter since
the Helper State Bank didn't have any equity in the properties
anyway.
Even if it were assumed for purposes of argument that
Kiahtipes was aware of the Helper State Bank liens this
still did not create a mutual mistake.

In fact, it would

show that the parties were aware of the lien but specifically
excluded it from the agreement as a condition precedent.
Thus, such knowledge would show not mutual mistake of fact,
but an exclusion of the Helper State Bank lien as an element
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upon which the agreement was conditioned.

The finding of

"mutual mistake" by the trial court is therefore unsupported
by the findings previously entered by the court and by any
evidence in the record itself.
CONCLUSION
The instant case demonstrates the classic example
of an instance where a seller enters into a deal with a
buyer, and subsequently changes his mind because of a new
profit opportunity and attempts to avoid the transaction.
Here, the agreement was clear that only PCA and the Federal
Land Bank had to approve the releasing of mortgages upon
receipt by PCA of all the proceeds of sale.

The approvals

were in fact agreed to and only awaited a vehicle to
implement them, i.e., an escrow or closing of some kind to
consummate the sale.
Defendants failed to notify Plaintiffs, or even
own

their

real estate agent, of the approvals and attempted a

new course of action to refinance the entire Mills estate
and debt structure.

Mills, together with his attorney,

Jensen, pursued throughout the summer a course that ignored
the contract but attempted to solve larger problems of Mills
without reference to the original Kiahtipes transaction.
The testimony of the bank attorney was that Helper State
Bank was never asked to release its liens upon the KiahtipesMills property; on the contrary, that PCA and the Federal

-33-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Land Bank were asked to release their respective interests
in property which was not even involved in the KiahtipesMills sale.
As the refinancing effort became fruitless, Defendants
then discovered they could sell their water stock which had
risen greatly in value and still retain their land.

At

that time, they evicted Kiahtipes from the property using
the excuse that PCA would not cooperate.
While the true motives of Defendants in refusing to
perform can only be inferred from the facts, it is the only
logical assumption based upon the various positions of
the institutions and the parcels of land which they encumbered.
There is no showing in the record whatsoever that the Helper
State Bank liens could have had any effect upon the sale to
Kiahtipes since the market value of the property would not
even satisfy the prior liens of PCA and the Federal Land
Bank, thereby precluding Helper State Bank from being
able to assert any type of interest.
For the foregiong reasons, therefore, this Court, as
a court of equity, should carefully review the evidence
in this case and should reverse the decision of the lower
court, enter judgment in favor of Plaintiffs, and award
attorneys' fees to Plaintiffs based upon the evidence
adduced at trial for the efforts required to enforce the
agreement.
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Respectfully submitted,
Reed L. Martineau
A. Dennis Norton
Craig S. Cook
Attorneys for PlaintiffsAppellants
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